April 5, 2012

How the ASR XL Acetabular System Causes Bone Deterioration...And what it means for your future hip revision surgeries.

By Taylor Lindstrom

When DePuy issued their hip recall, they offered to pay for the revision surgery needed to replace the faulty hip with a new implant. They appear to believe this is the full extent of their responsibility in repairing the damage they've done to thousands of people who had a hip replacement implanted in their bodies.
It's not enough. Because the damage the ASR XL Acetabular system caused doesn't end when the hip is removed. It's only just beginning. 

How Your Hips Work
If this were an after-school special, we'd show you a few clips at this point: Elvis shaking his hips on stage back in the day, or a ballet dancer extending her leg over her head. The after-school special would be missing the point, however - your hips are essential to nearly every movement you make. You use them every time you stand, sit, crouch, or lean over. You use them getting into and out of cars, climbing up the porch steps to your front door, even just standing there. 

A hip is a little bit like oxygen. You don't notice how essential it is until it's gone.
There's a reason you barely notice your hip's contribution to your everyday movements: your body has constructed it more or less perfectly. The hip bone is a portion of your pelvis, and it has a rounded cup-shape in its center into which the top of your femur bone fits, called the acetabulum.
The top of your femur fits smoothly into the acetabulum and rotates when you move, cushioned by synovial fluid that naturally lubricates the hip joint. When you get a hip implant, the idea is to mimic this natural construction of your hip joint as closely as possible, including the range of rotation, the lubrication, and the way the ball (the head) and socket (the acetabulum) fit together.
How a Hip Implant Works
There are two basic ways of affixing the hip implant to the rest of your skeleton. In both, the top of your femur is sawn off and replaced with an artificial new head, while the hip bone itself is shaved down to accommodate a man-made socket. Essentially, the acetabulum is carved out to the shape of the new socket.
The difference lies in how the new femur head and socket are attached to the surrounding bone. In older patients, the most common tactic is to use a bone cement to attach them. In younger patients, however, the surrounding bone is still versatile and capable of regrowth. Since cement has some serious drawbacks, including the risk that it will shrink or crack over time and the fact that it is not especially secure when it comes to withstanding forceful movements like jumping, another procedure has been developed for younger patients. 

DePuy Orthopedics, Inc_ ASR Hip Implants Linked to MetallosisHow

By Megan Breckenridge, Staff Writer
SULLO & SULLO, LLP

HOUSTON—On August 26, 2010, DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, announced it is voluntarily recalling two types of hip implants due to high early failure rates.
The recall affects the ASR™ XL Acetabular System, which is used for total hip replacements, and the DePuy ASR™ Hip Resurfacing system, which is used in a newer kind of bone-conserving procedure. To date, more than 93,000 of the devices have been implanted worldwide.
DePuy said that it was issuing the recall after new data from a British joint replacement registry showed about 1 in 8, or around 12 percent, of those who received the implants needed corrective procedures, called revision surgeries, within five years. Typically, the devices are supposed to last 15 years before requiring any corrective revision. 

DePuy’s hip replacement system—a metal-on-metal implant—has been linked to metal poisoning or metallosis, which, according to the Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery, is "aseptic fibrosis, local necrosis or loosening of a device secondary to metallic corrosion and release of wear debris." Design problems with the devices cause the metal components to rub against each other and shed microscopic metal particles into the body, which can result in soft tissue damage, inflammatory reactions and bone loss.
Symptoms of metallosis from metal-on-metal hip replacement devices can include pain, inflammation, tumors and difficulty walking. Specialized blood tests can be used to detect levels of toxic metals in patients experiencing these symptoms. In some cases, patients with DePuy implants have been found with 100 times the normal levels chromium and cobalt in their bodies. 

Metal-on-metal devices gained popularity in recent years among orthopedic surgeons and patients who believed they would be more durable than those made of other materials, such as ceramics. But it soon became apparent that many of the devices were deteriorating quickly, shedding metallic debris that was readily absorbed into the bloodstream. 

The New York Times reported in March that it was "not clear whether some makers’ devices are more prone to the debris problem than others. But some experts argue that some manufacturers, in a rush to meet the demand for metal-on-metal devices, marketed some poorly designed implants and that some doctors fail to properly implant even well-designed ones."
But it appears that DePuy’s ASR devices are more prone to debris problems than other brands. The first lawsuit filed in the United States against DePuy over the defective ASR hip implants was in March 2009—almost 18 months before the device was recalled. In fact, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) had received over 500 complaints about the devices through the years leading up to the recall, but no action was taken as a result. 

Much of the pain and problems behind the DePuy ASR total hip implant were caused by metallosis. But what does that really mean?

By Taylor Lindstrom

Johnson & Johnson has announced that its subsidiary company DePuy issued a voluntarily recall of their ASR hip implant due to a number of patients who required a second hip replacement procedure, called a revision surgery." 

No mention was made of metallosis in the Johnson & Johnson press release. In fact, Johnson & Johnson didn't mention any of the more significant symptoms patients are suffering after receiving a DePuy ASR XL hip implant. They would prefer that the public believed the revision surgery process is simple and fixes the problem of a faulty hip implant with absolutely no long-term effects. 

We're recommending you get a second opinion - and a blood test.
Metal-on-metal hip replacement bearings like the DuPuy ASR XL Acetabular System total hip replacement were originally reintroduced as an alternative to metal-on-plastic or ceramic hip replacement systems. Metal-on-metal implants (for a hip implant, this is a design that involves both a metal ball and a metal socket) have certain advantages over plastic or ceramic when the design is properly engineered. They last longer, have high resistance to wear and tear, and can withstand more vigorous activity, making metal-on-metal the usual choice for surgeons with younger, more active patients who are going to put more strain on their implants.
However, a poorly engineered metal-on-metal hip resurfacing system has considerable complications, many of them more serious than their ceramic or plastic counterparts. 

The Blue Cross Blue Shield Association Technology Evaluation Center report on metal-on-metal total hip resurfacing notes that metal-on-metal systems have risks of elevated heavy metal ion levels, delayed hypersensitivity to metals, and even carcinogenesis - cancer, to the layman.
All hip replacement systems release tiny particles of the implant's material into the body when the two parts of the hip replacement rub against one another. In metal-on-metal implants, a small amount of friction and metallosis is predictable and part of the considered risks when the surgeon recommends a certain type of hip implant. 

However, when the metal parts are improperly made or installed, the friction releases much more metal into the bloodstream, causing serious metallosis and metal poisoning.
Engineers who have examined the DuPuy ASR hip replacement system noted several design flaws that contributed to increased metallosis and metal poisoning in patients. The implant is shallower than most other hip replacement systems, which made it much more challenging to implant than other systems. DePuy was fully aware of this setback; their instructions to the surgeon recommended a much more precise placement than other implants. 

One engineer we consulted with went on to note that the requirements for placement were so specific that only about 3% surgeons would be able to place the hip implant properly. This is not a comment on the surgeon's skill; the engineer was quick to note that the placement demands would be impossible for all but the most skilled and experienced surgeons, and even then the surgeon would have to be fully informed of the importance of precise placement. 

The surgeon recommended a DePuy hip implant to his patient thinking the device was fully tested by the FDA for safety. He was wrong.

By Taylor Lindstrom

A 30-year-old man needs a hip replacement. His surgeon recommends a DePuy ASR XL Acetabular system because its metal-on-metal design is more durable and allows for a more active life. Following the doctor's recommendations, the young man gets the DePuy hip implant.
Then the hip implant fails. The young man is in extraordinary pain. His revision surgery reveals dead tissue and deteriorated bone, making it extremely difficult for his new implant to take hold. He takes a blood test that reveals extremely elevated levels of cobalt and chromium. He is now hypersensitive to metal and the surgeon warns him he may contract early-onset osteolysis.
The young man blames the surgeon for recommending the ASR XL Acetabular system in the first place? But the surgeon isn't the culprit in this scenario; he made the best recommendation he could for his patient. The surgeon is simply another victim of the real culprit: an FDA approval loophole called "substantial equivalence." 

A surgeon has countless medical devices to choose from. In the world of hip implants, he's looking at numerous options. The surgeon naturally wants to give his patients the best implant possible for their situation, so he chooses only FDA-approved devices that have been rigorously tested for safety.
Or so he thinks. 

Does an FDA Endorsement Guarantee Hip Implants' Safety?
The FDA has two processes for approving a new medical device: the premarket approval process,, and the premarket notification approval process. Similar as their names are, there is a world of difference between those two processes.
In the case of the patients who received an ASR XL Acetabular system, it may have been the difference between an improved quality of life with a working hip implant - or a drastically reduced quality of life with a faulty one. 

The premarket notification process is also known as the 510(k) process, and it includes the loophole of "substantial equivalence." The 510(k) process allows a product to go directly to market without full clinical testing if the manufacturer claims the medical device is "substantially equivalent" to another device already on the market.
According to FDA documents, a substantially equivalent product is one that is created for the same intended use as the previously approved products; has the same design, materials and technology; and raises no new concerns about safety or effectiveness.
Substantial equivalence was designed to prevent the 2-3 year waiting period for testing. If one hip implant is so similar to another device that it could be expected to get the same test results, what was the point of testing it?
One might argue "safety," but one would be naive to do so. Medical device companies pushed for the substantial equivalence loophole for an entirely different and far less altrustic reason: profits. Every year spent in testing is a year that hip implant isn't on the market earning money for the company.
A Pyramid Built on Sand
For Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary DePuy, the priority was on products, not patients. They claimed the ASR XL Acetabular System was "substantially equivalent" to no less than three other devices already on the market that had been tested for safety.
Every part of that statement would prove to be inaccurate.
Companies are allowed to claim that their new product is substantially equivalent to more than one other product. For example, since they have to show that they have the same materials and technology as a previously approved product, a company might show that they used the same materials as one product and the same technology as another.
For the ASR XL Acetabular system's 510(k) application, DePuy cited three different previously approved products saying that the ASR system was "substantially equivalent"-at least in part-to all three.
By this argument, you could get a safety approval from the FDA for a flying car with submarine without ever testing it - after all, it is "substantially equivalent" - at least in part - to an airplane, a car, and a submarine. What on earth would be the point in testing it again when the basic principles have already been proven safe? 

The loophole gets even more absurd: companies are allowed to base their claims of "substantial equivalence" on products that were approved under the same 510(k) process.
One of the devices DuPuy used was approved with one device-that had been approved through another device-that had been approved through a third device-that was approved because it was substantially equivalent to a product grandfathered into the system prior to 1976. 

Essentially, DePuy was claiming that their product was substantially equivalent to hip replacements manufactured before the FDA was ever in place
 
Not a single hip implant in this chain of FDA was ever subjected to clinical trials before it was allowed to go to market. Even if it had been, it seems laughable that a hip implant "substantially equivalent" to a series of pre-1976 implant could ever make it through the FDA. Has technology developed so slowly that the best implants on the market are based on designs from 40 years ago?
Put it into perspective: the ASR XL Acetabular system was marketed to younger people who needed a longer-lasting, more durable hip replacement. That means many of the recipients got a hip implant based on a design older than they were.
Only 10% of applications submitted under the 510(k) process are ever returned with a request for clinical trials. That means that 90% of the Class III hip implants available today were never tested in a clinical setting before being marketed to the public. 

The DePuy ASR XL Acetabular hip replacement system was FDA approved - which might be more cause for worry than relief.

By Lacy Boggs

Since 1976, all medical devices must be classified and approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before they can be legally marketed to the public. It is the fond belief of many Americans that FDA approval is a ringing endorsement of a product's safety, a guarantee that the device has been tested and re-tested by professionals who are presumably trained to put the device through all kinds of rigor to triple-check its safety and effectiveness before allowing it anywhere near our fragile human bodies.
It is, as we say, a fond belief, but not an accurate one. It seems that many medical devices - including the recently recalled DePuy ASR XL Acetabular System - are given an FDA approval and subsequently placed inside people's bodies without ever going through a single test at the FDA. 

The FDA department responsible for the regulation and review of medical devices is the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). CDRH divides medical devices into three classes: life-sustaining, life-supporting or implantable devices are designated as Class III.
Hip replacements, including the ASR XL system, qualify as a Class III device and are considered high risk to the patient's health. 

Class III devices can be approved by the FDA through one of two processes. The first, the premarket approval process (PMA) is more or less what we think of when we imagine our device being tested by the FDA: an extensive review including rigorous clinical trials that show it to be safe for use in humans. The PMA is quite detailed, lengthy, and expensive, usually costing the manufacturing company upwards of $250,000 and taking as much as two years to complete.
A quarter of a million is a large chunk of change - but thankfully for companies with a firm eye on their bottom line, there's always the second FDA approval process.
The premarket notification approval process, also known as the 510(k) approval process, is a sort of shortcut to approval that lowers the price point considerably - and also, conveniently, doesn't involve any pesky testing that might reveal a flaw in the product that would then have to be revamped and retested for another quarter-million. 

The 510(k) process basically pre-approves any product that is deemed "substantially equivalent" to another product already legally approved for sale. It costs less than $5,000, requires no clinical trials, and only takes an average of 3-6 months to complete. It's a good shortcut for products that are essentially identical to their forebears. After all, it hardly makes sense to waste the FDA's time when they could be helping get new, innovative, life-saving products to market. But what's to stop companies from claiming their products are "substantially equivalent" to other FDA-approved devices even if they're not remotely the same?
What, indeed
The ASR XL Acetabular hip replacement system got its seal of approval from the FDA using the 510(k) process, claiming that its product was substantially equivalent to other hip replacement devices already on the market. The FDA official in charge of approving the device would have gone through a checklist that included the following questions (simplified; the actual document is fairly dense):
  • Does the new product treat or solve the same problems as previously approved products?
  • Does the new product have the same design, materials, and energy sources as previously approved products?
  • Could any new characteristics or combinations of characteristics affect safety or effectiveness? 

April 4, 2012

DePuy Litigation: Statute of Limitations Depuy Lawsuits

By Independent Staff Writer

In August of 2010 DePuy Orthopedics, Inc. recalled two of its most popular hip replacement systems—the ASR XL Acetabular and the ASR Hip Resurfacing System. The recall came on the heels of a study which indicated the five-year failure rate of these products was as high as one in every eight patients. Severe pain and metal toxicity in the blood have required many of those who received a DePuy hip replacement to have revision surgery to replace the defective implant. Although the DePuy Pinnacle system has not yet been recalled it utilizes the same metal-on-metal design as the ASR, and many of those who received the Pinnacle implant have experienced the same symptoms including loosening of the hip implant, unsafe chromium and cobalt levels in the blood and extreme pain.  

What is a Statute of Limitations?
All lawsuits filed in the United States have an expiration period known as the Statute of Limitations. After this time period has passed an injured party is prohibited from filing a recovery case. These statutes are meant to guard companies from being exposed to lawsuits for long periods of time as well as to ensure the suits are filed while evidence is preserved and memories are clear. Depending on the state you reside in the statute of limitations for product liability can range from two to six years.

DePuy’s “Offer”
Following DePuy’s recall of their hip implants the company stated that patients who met specific criteria might be able to have some of their medical costs covered. Before any type of reimbursement is issued, however, DePuy will review patient’s medical records to determine whether the patient is eligible for reimbursement. The problem with this is that DePuy states the patient’s medical records must confirm a revision surgery is definitively related to the ASR recall rather than another cause such as a “traumatic fall.” In other words, the company is likely to attempt to blame the failure of the hip implant on a pre-existing condition, an underlying disease, physician error or misuse, therefore providing DePuy with sensitive medical records could well mean you would receive no money at all for the defective product implanted in your body.

Overview of the Statute of Limitations for Recalled DePuy Implants
If you received a DePuy hip implant and have suffered medical issues as a result, you must be aware of how the legal statute of limitations may affect your right to pursue legal action for the harm done to you. It is urged that potential claimants exercise a measure of urgency in obtaining legal representation for a potential recovery suit. The DePuy hip implant recall occurred in August of 2010, and it is estimated it affected more than 90,000 devices worldwide. In most states—including Texas—personal injury and product liability statute of limitations are only two years, therefore those who reside in a state where a two-year product liability statute exists may only have until August of 2012 to file a DePuy hip implant suit. In order to ensure you preserve your rights, it is a good idea for any hip implant recipient who has experienced painful side effects to seek prompt legal action in the event revision surgery becomes necessary.

April 3, 2012

Reviewing the Safety of Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants

By Independent Staff Writer

According to a recent BBC Newsnight investigation, literally hundreds upon thousands of patients across the globe may have been exposed to potentially toxic substances following the implantation of metal-on-metal hip implants. Even though it is now believed that the dangers of these hip devices—which appear to have been very poorly regulated at best—was well known and documented for decades, recipients of the devices were nonetheless kept in the dark. The implants which are in question are known as “metal-on-metal,” and are constructed via a head at the top and a lining the head fits into which are made of cobalt-chromium alloy.

The Failure Rate of Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants
These hip implants are used in hip replacements and hip resurfacing, and came into wide-spread use in the 1997. The target group for these metal-on-metal hip replacements was younger, still-active patients who expected the hip replacement to last the rest of their life. Unfortunately, the numbers show that the failure rates among both genders are significantly higher than normal—from 11.8% failure in resurfacing to 13.6% for the total hip replacement as compared to rates of only between 3 and 5% for implants made of other materials.

How Many People Have Hip Implants?
Since 2003, the BBC article reports that over 60,000 patients in England and Wales and over a million in the United States have received the potentially dangerous metal-on-metal hip replacement. The metal ions from the cobalt and chromium hip implants are believed to seep into local tissues causing reactions which can not only destroy muscle and bone but can eventually leave the victim with a permanent disability. The fact that cobalt and chromium can lead to such serious health issues was actually documented in scientific journals over three decades ago.

Was There a Cover-up?
DePuy, a major manufacturer of the metal-on-metal hip implant, released an internal memo in 2005 which stated that in addition to possible changes in immune functioning there was additional concern that the metal debris from the device could be carcinogenic. The memo went on to state that the possibility of distant effects of the device was “worrying,” and that one study indicated a three times higher risk of lymphoma and leukemia ten years following the hip replacement. Despite these very real concerns DePuy continued marketing the device and indicated none of the potential health concerns in their subsequent promotional materials.

A Discussion of the Long-Term Health Effects of the Hip Implant
In 2006 the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency convened a meeting to discuss the long-term health effects of the metal-on-metal hip implant made from cobalt and chromium. An advisory board was appointed, however out of the group’s eight members, two were consultants for DePuy and one was the director of product development for Smith and Nephew—obvious conflicts of interest. In the end the group chose to sidestep the potential dangers of the metal-on-metal hip implants, even refusing to warn women of child-bearing age of the potential dangers despite the fact that metal ions had previously been detected in umbilical cord and placental blood among women with the implant. No alert was put out to either surgeons or patients, and it was not until March of 2011 that the British Orthopedic Association sent out a warning advising that the metal-on-metal hip replacements should be “carefully considered and possibly avoided.”